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Did Lobachevsky have a model of his Imaginary geometry? 
1) Introduction
The canonical story about discovery of Non-Euclidean geometries goes like this. Since 
Antiquity people looked at Euclid's Fifth Postulate (P5) with a suspicion because unlike 
other Postulates and Axioms of Euclid's Elements P5 didn't seem self-obvious. For this 
reason people tried to prove P5 as a theorem (on the basis of the rest of Postulates 
and Axioms). Typically they tried to prove P5 by reductio ad absurdum taking the 
negation of P5 as a hypothesis and hoping to infer a contradiction out of it (and the 
rest of the axioms). However the desired contradiction didn't show up. Consequences 
of non-P5 were unusual but not overtly contradictory. At certain point some people 
including Gauss, Bolyai and Lobachevsky guessed that non-P5 opens a door into a vast 
unexplored territory rather then leads to the expected dead end. Lobachevsky was the 
first one who shared this opinion with public and explored some issues of the new 
geometry which he called Imaginary in his IG (Note 0). However the issue remained 
highly speculative until Beltrami  in (1868) found some models of Lobachevsky's 
geometry, which proved that Lobachevsky's geometry is consistent and so can be 
treated on equal footing with Euclidean. Finally Hilbert in his (1899) put things in order 
by modernising Euclidean axiomatic method and clarifying the logical structure of Non-
Euclidean geometries (Note 1).
Obviously the story is oversimplified. However my task now is not to provide it with 
additional details but question a basic assumption, which this simplified version of 
history shares with a number of better elaborated ones.  This assumption concerns 
the very notion of mathematical theory.  The notion of theory, which goes on a par 
with the above story is described in the following quote:   
"[P]rimitive terms, such as "point", "line" and "plane" are undefined and could just as 
well be replaced with other terms without affecting the validity of results. ... Despite 
this change in terms, the proof of all our theorems would still be valid, because 
correct proofs do not depend on diagrams; they depend only on stated axioms and the 
rules of logic. Thus, geometry is a purely formal exercise in deducing certain 
conclusions from certain formal premises.  Mathematics makes statements of the 
form "if ... then"; it doesn't say anything about the meaning or truthfulness of the 
hypotheses." (Greenberg 1974, p.252) 
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discovery of Non-Euclidean geometry:
"The formalist viewpoint just stated is a radical departure from the older notion that 
mathematics asserts "absolute truths", a notion that was destroyed once and for all 
by the discovery of Non-Euclidean geometry. This discovery has had a liberating effect 
on mathematics, who now feel free to invent any set of axioms they wish and deduce 
conclusions from them. In fact this freedom may account for the great increase in the 
scope and generality of modern mathematics. " (ibid.) (Note 2)
The above quote suggests that Lobachevsky was one of those liberators who detached 
geometrical reasoning from intuition and spatial experience, stopped asking whether or 
not usual axioms of geometry are true and came to the notion of mathematics as 
playing with axioms. As we shall shortly see this has nothing to do with the historical 
reality. Before coming to a more detailed discussion let me point to one question, 
which Greenberg's story leaves unanswered.  Why Lobachevsky and others  played with 
P5 but not another postulate or axiom? The obvious reason for it is that on the 
traditional account P5 (unlike other Euclid's axioms and postulates) looked dubious to 
begin with; unlike other postulates and axioms it was not self-evident. This triggered 
the long-term research on the "Problem of parallels", which led to the discovery of 
Non-Euclidean geometry in 19th century. These facts make it possible to refer to the 
discovery of Non-Euclidean geometry as an evidence justifying the traditional view on 
geometry. The argument may go like this: since ancient times the old good geometrical 
intuition showed that P5 is not universally true and finally in19-th century 
Lobachevsky and others proved this fact rigorously. This shows how much one's 
favourite interpretation of history of mathematics depends on one's stance 
concerning the subject-matter of mathematics itself.
As I shall argue the above popular view on the history of geometry of 19th century is 
deeply misleading. However I shall not blame its overtly anachronistic character for it. 
For I don't believe that anachronisms can and should be ruled out from a historical 
study of mathematics on general methodological grounds. As far as a study of history 
of mathematics is supposed to be something else than making a mere chronology one 
needs to rely onto some ideas about mathematics to begin with. Otherwise one cannot 
even say a history of what he or she is going to study, and why certain historical 
sources qualify as mathematical while some other do not. In this very general sense 
every interesting history of mathematics is doomed to be anachronistic. The 
difference between good and bad anachronisms is more subtle.  A historian may 
extract from given sources everything that fits his or her favourite notion of 
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teleological history showing how mathematics progresses from its early days toward 
its glorious today's state. I count this method as a bad anachronism even if the fit is 
well justified. Alternatively the historian may take seriously difficulties of application 
of today's schemes to older sources and try to revise these schemes (rather than the 
sources!) aiming at a better fit. This latter method, which I adhere to, has at least two 
advantages. First, it allows not only for tracing the history of mathematics in the 
narrow sense (i.e. history of acquiring of existing mathematical knowledge) but also 
the history of changing notion of mathematics. In other words it allows for a view on 
history of mathematics as a chapter of the history of ideas. Second, the latter 
strategy makes the historical research about mathematics interesting for the 
mathematical research itself. For it eventually helps reviving some old ideas which can 
turn to be interesting for mathematics and its philosophy today and perhaps even 
tomorrow.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. I start with a more precise description 
of conceptual scheme used in canonical historical reconstructions of geometry of 
19th century. Then I stress difficulties arising when one anachronistically applies this 
scheme to Lobachevsky's work and finally propose a remedy. We shall see that the 
question of whether or not Lobachevsky had a model of his geometry has two answers 
none of which is of yes-or-no kind. The first immediate answer is that the question is 
ill-posed since Lobachevsky didn't have anything like our notion of model in his disposal 
but worked in an older conceptual framework which combined traditional "synthetic" 
geometrical methods with certain analytic devices. I shall show that the popular view 
according to which this traditional approach doesn't work in Non-Euclidean geometry 
cannot be justified. The second answer is subtler and more interesting. There is in 
fact an aspect of Lobachevsky's work relevant to our current notion of model. But 
Lobachevsky's counterpart of this today's notion is nevertheless strikingly different. 
Allowing for the talk of models in Lobachevsky one discovers something surprising: 
Lobachevsky didn't have a model for the geometrical theory known by his name (unless 
one counts as a model some usual intuitions associated with geometrical concepts like 
in Euclidean case) but he built a non-standard model of Euclidean plane in a Non-
Euclidean space (sic).  We shall see that this construction, which from the today's 
viewpoint might look bizarre is crucially important for Lobachevsky's project. I shall 
conclude explaining an approach to building mathematical theories, which makes 
Lobachevsky's construction to look more natural. 
42) Hilbertian scheme 
Euclidean geometry and Lobachevskian geometry are two different theories. How 
exactly these theories are identified and distinguished one from the other? There is a 
sense in which certain parts of Euclid's Elements also can be also qualified as different 
theories, for example, basic Euclidean Planimetry developed in Books 1-4 and the 
Theory of Proportions of Book 5. But obviously Euclidean and Lobachevskian 
geometries are called different theories in a stronger sense than that. In which 
stronger sense exactly? A standard answer relies upon the notion of theory suggested 
by Hilbert in his (1899) and later elaborated by Veblen, Tarski and others. Here a 
theory is identified with a list of axioms together with all propositions (theorems) 
deducible from these axioms. As far as rules of logic governing the deduction are 
assumed to be the same for the whole of mathematics mathematical theories may be 
distinguished by their (non-logical) axioms alone. Accordingly Euclidean and 
Lobachevskian geometries can be distinguished through (an appropriately reformulated 
version of) P5: Euclidean geometry assumes P5 while Lobachevskian geometry 
assumes non-P5; the rest of their axioms the two theories share in common.  We see 
that unlike different parts of Elements Euclidean and Lobachevskian geometries are 
logically incompatible. But the notion of incompatibility involved here is also not so 
simple as it seems. True, combining the two theories into one immediately brings a 
contradiction. But the method of theory-building applied here and the epistemic 
scheme associated with this method (which I shall call Hilbertian for further 
references) allow for considering the two geometries on equal footing and doesn't 
require ruling one of them out in favour of the other. Allowing for such a peaceful co-
existence of logically incompatible theories Hilbertian scheme makes them 
epistemically compatible. We have already know from the above Greenberg's quote 
about the price of this tolerance: the scheme rules out as senseless questions like 
whether on not P5 is really true or false. (Note 3) In 1899 when Hilbert's Grundlagen 
were first published such pluralism about geometrical axioms was not yet common, but 
on the contrary looked like a strong and very controversial epistemic view about 
Mathematics. 
One may argue that what I call here Hilbertian scheme is commonly known under the 
name Axiomatic method, and so the new suggested name is useless. I disagree 
because I think that the neutral title of Axiomatic method too easily becomes 
misleading, particularly in historical contexts. For it hides essential differences 
between Hilbert's version of this method (and its more modern versions based on 
Hilbert's), on the one hand,  and more traditional versions of Axiomatic method, on the 
other hand. Traditionally axioms are understood as "first" self-evident truths, which 
cannot be possibly proven. Aristotle famously argued that trying to prove everything 
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truths from more obvious ones. Frege was among those who defended this traditional 
understanding of Axiomatic method in Hilbert's time. Remark that this traditional 
version of the method doesn't allow the pluralism about mathematical matters, which 
has been described above. Hilbertian scheme has some very special features, which 
make this pluralism possible. Let me now briefly remind them.     
Propositions (i.e. axioms and theorems), elements of propositions and theories 
(systems of propositions linked by deduction) are viewed within Hilbertian scheme in 
two different ways.  First, they are viewed as syntactic constructions having no 
meaning and truth-value. So conceived theories and propositions are called formal. 
Formal propositions are supposed to be provided with meaning and truth-values 
through a special procedure of interpretation, which assigns to terms of a given 
proposition some particular mathematical objects (Note 4). This procedure makes 
formal propositions into "usual" propositions having meaning and certain truth-values; 
this meaning and these truth-values obviously depend on the aforementioned 
assignment. This is the second way to conceive of a proposition within Hilbertian 
scheme.  An assignment, which makes all provable (deducible) propositions of a given 
theory true is called model of this theory. A given theory may have multiple models 
and multiple "would-be-models", in which some formally provable propositions are true 
but some other turn to be false.  
The role of models in Hilbertian scheme is (at least) twofold. First, models provide an 
intuitive support allowing, for example, for thinking of proposition "given two points 
there exist an unique straight line going through these points" in the usual way. 
(Alternatively one can think of points in the way one usually thinks of straight lines 
and think of straight lines in the way one usually thinks of points. It would make a 
difference in Euclidean geometry in which there exist lines without common points but 
not in Projective geometry in which any two straight lines intersect.) Second, models 
help for proving consistency of theories and independence of some axioms from some 
other axioms. For proving consistency of a given theory T it suffices to find some 
model M of T. A naive reasoning behind this claim is this: if some proposition P of T is 
true in M then proposition non-P is not true in M, and so T contains no contradiction. 
For it is not possible that P and non-P are both true "about" one and the same M (Note 
5). Obviously for establishing that a given M is a model of a given theory T it is 
sufficient to check that axioms of T are true in M . Given that the axioms are true and 
inferences are valid T contains no contradiction. Notice that this argument takes us 
back to the traditional axiomatic method. This is why in the Hilbertian case one needs a 
refined  version of it. The usual refinement goes as follows. Let's first take some 
mathematical theory, say, arithmetic, for granted. This means that we assume both 
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assumed theory (with its chosen model) a metatheory. Take now another formal 
theory B and build its model MB from elements of MA. Then you are in a position to 
claim that if theory A is consistent then so is B . Instead of consistency tout court one 
gets in this way only a proof of relative consistency. This is less than one might desire 
but still a lot. In particular this method allows for proving the relative consistency of 
Lobachevskian geometry with respect to Euclidean geometry and relative consistency 
of both these theories with respect to arithmetic. This provides a sufficient ground 
for claiming that there is no more reason to expect a contradiction in Lobachevskian 
geometry than in Euclidean. 
I mention here all these well-known details (Note 6) because one should distinguish 
them very clearly before considering how to use Hilbertian scheme for a historical 
reconstruction.  We can now see in which precise sense Greenberg is right claiming 
that the older notion of "absolute truth" was "destroyed" in modern mathematics: 
within the new scheme mathematical truths are no longer "absolute" but are "truths in 
a given model" which may turn into falsities in some other models (or would-be models) 
(Note 7). However, as we shall shortly see, Greenberg goes too far claiming that this 
destruction was due to the discovery of Non-Euclidean geometries. True,  Hilbertian 
scheme wouldn't come about in 1899 without the discovery of Non-Euclidean 
geometries earlier in the same century. But this gives no ground for the claim that in 
works of Lobachevsky and other pioneers of Non-Euclidean geometry Hilbertian 
scheme was already inherently present. Let's now have a look at Lobachevsky's 
writings and see whether there is some trace of Hilbertian scheme there. For the 
following discussion I take Lobachevsky's STP as the principle reference. For 
discussing some epistemological issues I shall also refer to FG and NFG. (Note 8) 
3)Hyperbolic intuition
STP is written in the classical Euclidean "synthetic" style reinforced by analytic 
methods described in the next section. As far as the logical structure of presentation 
is concerned it is apparently not of Lobachevsky's major concern. Lobachevsky 
presents to the reader a list of propositions without specifying which of them are 
definitions, which are assumed as axioms and which are assumed as commonly known 
theorems (independent of P5); among following proved propositions there are 
theorems known to Lobachevsky from his sources as well as theorems first proven by 
Lobachevsky himself. From a historical viewpoint these features of Lobachevsky's 
style are hardly surprising since all of Lobachevsky's predecessors and 
contemporaries working on the "Problem of parallels" also followed the same 
traditional line. I stress these features only in order to confront the widespread 
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required an abrupt departure from the "usual" spatial intuition. To see that the myth 
has neither historical nor serious theoretical ground behind it let's reconsider after 
Lobachevsky the issue of parallels in its traditional setting. Instead of P5 I shall use 
after Lobachevsky the following Axiom of Parallels (AP) known to be equivalent to P5 
since Antiquity (Note 9): 
(AP) Given a line and a point outside this line there is unique other line which is parallel 
to the given line and passes through the given point.
Here the term "parallels" stands as usual for straight lines having no common points. 
We'll se shortly how Lobachevsky changes this Euclidean terminology. For a 
terminological convenience I shall call a given straight line secant of another given 
straight line when the two lines intersect (in a single point). Let's now make the 
required construction and listen what our intuition says about it. The whole point of 
the Problem of Parallels traditionally conceived is that the intuition says nothing 
definite as to whether AP is true or not. However it says us few other important 
things:
(i) Parallel lines exist (unlike round squares); moreover through a given point P outside 
a given straight line l passes at least one parallel line m. Such construction can be 
readily made on the basis of Euclid's Postulates without using P5, AP or their 
equivalents. Drop a perpendicular PS from P to l and then produce another 
perpendicular m to PS passing through P . The fact that m  is parallel to l follows from 
the theorem about an external angle of triangle, which is a theorem of "absolute 
geometry", that is, it doesn't depend on P5 or its equivalents.  In other words a line, 
which is lower than a given secant is also a secant. (fig.1, Note 10)
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line passing through the given point.  To construct a secant take any point of the given 
line and connect it to the given point outside this line. 
(iii) Let PS be perpendicular to l and A be a point of l. Consider a straight line PR such 
that angle SPR makes a proper part of angle SPA (and hence is less than angle SPA). 
Given this I shall call line PR lower than line PA (and call PA upper than PR). Notice that 
this definition involves the perpendicular PS, and so depends on the choice of P. Then 
PR intersects l in some point B, i.e. it is a secant (fig.2, Note 11). 
f ig.2
(iv) There exist no upper bound for secants of a given line passing through a given 
point outside this given line. For given some secant PA one can always take a further 
point C such that A will lay between S and C and so secant PC be upper than the given 
secant PA  (fig. 2).
(v) Let m  be parallel to l , which is constructed as in (i). Let n be another parallel to l 
passing through the same point P.  Suppose that n is lower than m (obviously this 
condition doesn't restrict the generality). Then any straight line which is upper than n 
and lower than m  is also parallel to l (fig. 3)
9f ig.3
(vi) Parallels to a given straight line passing through a given point have a lower bound. 
To assure it rigorously one needs some continuity principle like one asserting the 
existence of Dedekind cuts. Then (vi) follows from (iv). Lobachevsky doesn't  states 
such a principle explicitly but endorses (vi) anyway.
(vii) Any straight line PA - a secant or a parallel - passing through point P as shown at 
fig. 2 is wholly characterised by its characteristic angle SPA. In particular this 
concerns the lowest parallel mentioned in (vi). Let the measure of SPA corresponding 
to the case of the lowest parallel be α. Now it is clear that by an appropriate choice of 
l and P one can make  α as close to π/2 as one wishes. For given any angle SPA <  π/2 
it is always possible to drop perpendicular AT on PS (fig.4). Then PA is a secant of AT 
and so by (iii) all parallels to AT including its lowest parallels are upper than PA. Hence 
the value of α corresponding to straight line AT and point P outside this line is between 
SPA and π/2. Since the only variable parameter of the configuration is the distance d 
between the given straight line and the given point outside this line α is wholly 
determined by this distance.    
f ig.4
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(i - vii) provide the intuitive basis for Lobachevsky's Imaginary geometry (see STP, 
propositions 7, 16, 21). He proceeds as follows. First, he makes a terminological 
change: he calls "parallels" (not just non-intersecting straight lines but) the two 
boundary lines which separate secants from non-secants (i.e. parallels in the usual 
terminology) passing through a given point. So in Lobachevsky's terms there exist 
exactly two parallels to a given straight lines passing through a given point, which may 
eventually coincide if AP holds (i.e. in the Euclidean case). For further references I 
shall call these two parallels right and left (remembering that this assignment is purely 
conventional).  From Lobachevsky's new definition of parallels doesn't immediately 
follow that parallels form equivalence classes; moreover the definition involves the 
choice of P. So Lobachevsky must show that the property of being parallel (in his new 
sense) to a given straight line  is independent of this choice (STP, proposition 17), and 
that the relation of being parallel is symmetric and transitive (while reflexivity may be 
granted by the usual convention) (STP, propositions 18, 25). For the obvious reason 
transitivity may work here only for parallels of the same orientation, i.e. separately 
for right and for left parallels. Lobachevsky provides the required proofs making them 
in the traditional synthetic Euclidean-like manner (Note 12). Then Lobachevsky proves 
some further properties of parallels, in particular the fact that the angle α 
characterising a parallel (see vii above) can be made not only however close to π/2 but 
also however close to zero (STP, proposition 23). This immediately implies that if P5 
doesn't hold then given an angle ABC, however small, there always exist a straight line 
l laying wholly inside this angle and intersecting none of its two sides (fig.6).
f ig.6
This is already by far more counterintuitive than (i-vii) but still not counterintuitive 
enough to rule out this construction as absurd and on this ground to claim a proof of 
P5. 
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So far I have presented only basics of Lobachevsky's theory which were mostly known 
before Lobachevsky, noticeably to Sacceri and Lambert (Note 13). Nevertheless we 
are already in a position to make some important epistemological conclusions about 
Lobachevsky's work. First conclusion concerns the popular view according to which 
development of Non-Euclidean geometries required a departure from the spatial 
intuition in favour of a more abstract kind of thinking like one promoted in (Hilbert 
1899) or perhaps some other. This view is typically supported by the claim that the 
common human spatial intuition is inherently Euclidean (Note 14). Lobachevsky's work 
clearly demonstrates that this view and its supporting claim are ungrounded. True, 
giving up P5 one enters into a rather unusual world. It looks unusual in eyes of anyone 
who studied geometry by Euclid's Elements or its later replacements, and particularly 
so if this study didn't involve any discussion of difficulties of Euclid's theory including 
the problem of P5. I claim that the "Euclidean intuition" which allegedly prevents one 
from conceiving of Lobachevsky's geometry intuitively can be nothing but a result of a 
very superficial  study of Elements or its later replacements. Experts new about the 
Problem of Prallels since ancient times and kept their minds open. They didn't need 
anything like Hilbertian scheme to conceive of Lobachevskian geometry. For the 
unusual world of this geometry is intuitive just like Euclidean. True, it takes some time 
and training to feel at home in Lobachevskian spaces. However the required training 
aims at acquiring some new intuitive capacities, not at getting rid of intuition. What 
one should give up in order to conceive of Lobachevskian geometry intuitively is to give 
up P5 having a poor intuitive support. The failure of all the attempts to prove P5 on 
the basis of some intuitively evident statement leaving no room for any reasonable 
doubt, is perhaps the best evidence against the claim that the common spatial 
intuition is inherently Euclidean.  
It is certainly true that after Hilbert one can develop Lobachevskian geometry in an 
abstract or "formal" way. But this is equally true about Euclidean geometry! Thus both 
geometries are neutral with respect to the choice between the traditional intuitive and 
the modern formal treatment.  Although the controversy between the "formal" and 
the "intuitive" approaches to geometry didn't emerge before (Hilbert 1899) a similar 
controversy was already known in 19th century. I mean the controversy between 
"analytic" and "synthetic" ways of doing geometry. Here is what Lobachevsky says 
about it in the Preface to his NFG:   
" In Mathematics people use two methods: analysis and synthesis. A specific 
instrument of analysis are equations, which serve here as the first basis of any 
judgement and which lead to all conclusions. Synthesis or the method of constructions 
involves representations immediately connected in our mind with our basic concepts. 
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<...> Science starts with a pure synthesis; all the rest is produced by jugement which 
derives new data from the first data given by synthesis and thus broadens our 
knowledge unlimitedly into all directions. Without any doubt the first data are always 
acquired in nature through our senses. Mind can and must reduce them to minimum, so 
they could serve as a solid foundation for science." (Note 15)
The fact that Lobachevsky stresses the importance of synthetic approaches in 
science in general and in geometry in particular shows that unlike some of his 
contemporaries he was not at all sympathetic to the idea of replacing intuitive 
geometrical reasoning by some sort of calculus. He rather believed that spatial 
intuition and spatial experience are ultimate sources of geometrical truths (Note 16) 
and that analytic methods serve only for "derivation of new data from first data". This 
shows that Greenberg's claim according to which the discovery of Non-Euclidean 
geometry "had a liberating effect on mathematics, who now feel free to invent any set 
of axioms they wish and deduce conclusions from them" has no historical support 
whatsoever as far as Lobachevsky is concerned.  
A subtler point is this. It may be argued that since one admits that intuition cannot 
either justify or refute P5 (or any equivalent proposition) one cannot any longer count 
on intuition as a source of truthfulness of geometrical axioms (even if it can still 
continue to play some other role). Then, so the argument goes, one is doomed to 
accept some version of Greenberg's "ifthenism" and refuse from any "absolute" notion 
of truth in geometry. 
I cannot see that the argument is valid. The fact that intuition cannot either justify or 
refute P5 can be reasonably understood in the sense that nor P5 neither its negation 
should be considered as plausible axioms. One doesn't need any drastic reconsideration 
of the role of intuition for it. Actually Lobachevsky never aimed at building a new 
geometrical theory, which could be taken with Euclidean geometry on equal footing. 
Like Boliay Lobachevsky aimed at a generalisation of the known geometry, which 
wouldn't assume dubious P5 or any other dubious principle equivalent to P5. This is how 
he describes his principle achievement in the Introduction to his NFG:    
"The principle conclusion, to which I arrived ....  was the possibility of Geometry in a 
broader sense than it has been  [earlier] presented by Founder Euclid. This extended 
notion of this science [=of Geometry] I called Imaginary Geometry; Usual  [=Euclidean] 
Geometry is included in it as a particular case."
To include Euclidean geometry as a special case of Lobachevsky's Imaginary geometry 
it is sufficient to take α in (vii) to be equal to π/2; in this case Lobachevsky's two 
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parallels to a given straight line coincide. What remains problematic here is the nature 
of variation of  α. (vi) says us nothing about the value of α except that it is positive 
but don't exceed π/2. Does this mean that one can stipulate by fiat  any value of α 
from the given interval ? Geometry traditionally makes a sharp distinction between 
universally valid propositions (axioms and theorems) and particular constructions with 
their stipulated properties. One is free to build constructions with any desired 
properties as far as these constructions are doable with Euclid's Postulates or some 
other assumed constructive principles (Note 17). For example, one is free to produce 
a right angle, an acute angle or an obtuse angle depending on one's personal taste or 
specific purpose. But in this traditional setting one is not free to stipulate axioms and 
constructive principles (postulates) in a similar way. This, of course, provides 
essential constraints on possible choices. One may opt, for example, for constructing 
with Euclid's Postulates (but without P5) a triangle with a right angle. But then one has 
only a limited choice of possible values of the two other angles of the triangle: both of 
them must be acute since otherwise the construction is provably impossible. Let's now 
see how these basic rules of the game apply to the construction shown at fig.4 above. 
 According to (vii) both Lobachevsky's parallels passing through a given point P are 
uniquely determined by distance x = PS. This means that given line l and point P 
outside this line angle APS = α has some definite value and cannot be any longer a 
matter of stipulation. What we can do to learn this value? Since we have no better 
choice we can make some hypothetical  reasoning about it. It can be proven that if  α = 
π/2 (the Euclidean case) then the same holds for any other choice of l and point P 
(compare STP, proposition 20). If  α < π/2 the situation becomes more complicated 
because, as we have already observed in (vii), in this case the value of α depends on 
distance x. Anticipating what follows I give here Lobachevsky's fundamental equation, 
which expresses this dependence: 
tan(α /2) = a exp(-x)    (1)
where a is a positive factor. How to interpret this formula? The factor makes a new 
trouble. On the one hand, it is clear that the unit used for measuring distance x can be 
always chosen in such a way that (1) takes this most convenient form: 
tan(α /2) = e exp(-x)   (1') 
were e is the base of natural logarithms. Then α gets determined by x as expected. 
Lobachevsky makes this move in his STP saying only that it "simplifies calculations". 
But on the other hand, a different choice of unit brings a different value of α in each 
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particular case. So it turns out that the value of α depends of our arbitrary choice of 
unit, which is supposed to be a matter of convention having no theoretical significance 
at all! Turning things the other way round one may also say that the unite of length is 
uniquely determined here by α, that is, that the usual liberty to choose the unit 
arbitrarily cannot be any longer granted. This is the way in which this situation was 
interpreted earlier by Lambert (Note 18). 
We see that the traditional distinction between universally valid propositions, on the 
one hand, and arbitrary stipulations concerning particular constructions, on the other 
hand, in the context of Non-Euclidean geometry is blurred. The old rules of the game 
don't really apply to the new situation. One expects to have a definite value of α in the 
construction shown at fig.4 but can make only some hypothetic reasoning about it. But 
can Greenberg's "ifthenism" making no difference between axioms and mere 
hypotheses be indeed a remedy? Actually the ifthenist approach to the problem was 
known long before Hilbert and even before Lobachevsky.  Sacceri and after him 
Lambert both began with the "absolute" geometry (based on Euclidean Axioms and 
Postulates except P5) and then considered separately the "hypothesis of right angle" 
equivalent to P5, the "hypothesis of acute angle" and  the "hypothesis of obtuse angle" 
(Note 19). They ruled out the third hypothesis without using P5 but could not do the 
same with the second hypothesis. To develop two mutually incompatible systems of 
reasoning one of which grants the first hypothesis while the other grants the second 
hypothesis doesn't look like an interesting solution in this context even if one provides 
it with some supporting epistemological arguments.  Notice that this move anyway 
doesn't help to treat the problem of "absolute unit of length" about which Lambert was 
already aware.  
A solution, which later became standard, was found after Beltrami in his (1968-69) 
identified Lobachevskian spaces as Riemaninan manifolds of constant negative 
curvature; in this Riemannean setting Lambert's "absolute unit" could be then 
identified with the radius of curvature. Lobachevsky didn't have yet this solution in 
hands (Note 20) but he already had a basic idea according to which the smaller are 
distances the closer Imaginary geometry becomes to Euclidean. To see this consider, 
for example, the following diagram taken from a Schumacher's letter to Gauss (see 
Gauss 1981, v.8, p.213) 
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It shows (or at least suggests) that if triangle ABC  is infinitely small then the sum of 
its internal angles becomes infinitely close to two right angles (notice the semicircle). 
This fundamental observation gives a sense in which one and the same space can be 
Euclidean and Non-Euclidean at the same time: it can be Euclidean "in the small" and 
Non-Euclidean "in the large". A logically-minded reader can probably say that this is a 
sheer contradiction anyway. I shall not go here for a general discussion about logical 
aspects of infinitesimals but only remark that this logical difficulty is not specific to 
Non-Euclidean geometry. The aforementioned claim about geometrical spaces is no 
more contradictory than the claim that any smooth curve line is everywhere straight 
in the small. This kind of "smooth thinking" was fundamental for the whole of 
mathematics and physics of 18-19 century. Importantly this view allowed for retaining 
the older notion of intuition as a truth-maker.  The very idea that geometrical 
properties could depend of "absolute" distances (as distinguished from ratios of 
distances) was, of course, unusual but it was certainly not counter-intuitive. It allowed 
for considering the old Euclidean intuition as a "local approximation" of a larger (but 
not "alternative") geometrical intuition. Thus Greenberg's view that the invention of 
Non-Euclidean geometry destroyed the older notion of intuition as a truth-maker and 
left the "inthenism" about mathematical matters as the only available alternative is 
certainly wrong both historically and theoretically. Although some moderate form of 
ifthenism can be indeed attributed to Sacceri, Lambert and perhaps to some other 
geometers it didn't play any significant role in the history of geometry before Hilbert. 
In particular, Lobachevsky never went for it.    
At the same time, it is my impression that Lobachevsky simply didn't have any 
accomplished theory about how Euclidean and Non-Euclidean geometry relate to each 
other. In spite of his official view on Imaginary geometry as generalisation of Euclidean 
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geometry Lobachevsky often informally speaks about the two geometries as if they 
were incompatible. Consider, for example this interesting passage from the 
Introduction to NFG where Lobachevsky puts forward a view according to which 
geometry of physical space is determined by "natural forces":
[T]he assumption according to which some natural forces follow one Geometry while 
some other forces follow some other specific Geometry, which is their proper 
Geometry, cannot bring any contradiction into our mind.  
Thus it is not completely unreasonable, of course, to look at Lobachevsky as a 
predecessor of Hilbert, who unlike Hilbert didn't have yet a clear idea about how 
different geometries can live together. But it is not unreasonable either to say that 
Lobachevsky anticipated another idea of how geometries can live together, namely one 
based on Riemann's ideas. How the two ideas interacted in history is an interesting 
question which I cannot touch upon here. But in the last section of this paper I shall 
provide a sketch of a today's approach to building geometrical theories, which develops 
the older Riemannean way of reasoning up to the point where it becomes compeatable 
with Hilbertean scheme.    
Taking into consideration what has been told so far about Lobachevsky's work one may 
come to conclusion that the question "Did Lobachevsky have a model of his geometry?" 
has no more sense than the question whether or not Euclid has a model of his 
geometry. Hilbert's scheme described in the beginning of this paper seems to have no 
more relevance to Lobachevsky than to Euclid. We shall now see that in fact the 
question allows for a more specific and more interesting answer.
 
4) Hyperbolic calculus
To see that the notion of model is not totally irrelevant to Lobachevsky's work 
consider the following quote from FG:
"The geometry on the limiting sphere is exactly the same as on the plane. Limiting 
circles stand for straight lines while angles between planes of these circles stand for 
angles between straight lines."
Even without knowing the exact sense of Lobachevsky's terms (which I shall shortly 
explain) one can see here a basic element of Hilbertean scheme, namely the notion 
that usual geometrical terms like "straight line" and "angle between straight lines" can 
stand for something else than they usually stand for without producing any essential 
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change in the corresponding theory (in this case - Euclidean geometry). Speaking in 
today's terms Lobachevsky describes here a non-standard model of Euclidean plane. 
Why not a model of his new Hyperbolic geometry as the today's reader would most 
probably expect? Why Lobachevsky translates convenient notions of Euclidean 
geometry into a new language of Hyperbolic geometry rather than the other way 
round? Let me now explain why and how.  
Basic facts about Hyperbolic geometry proven by synthetic methods and mentioned in 
the previous section were mostly known before Lobachevsky. However it was 
Lobachevsky who first publicly claimed the invention  of Non-Euclidean geometry while 
earlier workers in the field remained reserved. Actually Lobachevsky's conviction that 
he indeed invented a new geometry, or more precisely found a far-reaching 
generalisation of the old geometry, was not without a reason: he first managed to 
supply a system of synthetic reasoning described in the previous section with an 
appropriate analytic apparatus. Lobachevsky uses his non-standard model of Euclidean 
plane for developing this analytic apparatus. I shall now briefly explain how it works 
referring the reader to STP for further details. 
In Euclidean geometry there are two kinds of sheaves of straight lines: (a) sheaves of 
parallel lines and (b) sheaves of lines passing through the same point. Given a sheaf of 
either sort consider a line (or surface in 3D case) normal to each line of the given 
sheaf. So you get (a) either a  straight line (plane in 3D case) or (b) a circle (sphere in 
3D case ) (fig.8 a, b)
a b
fig. 8 
In Lobachevskian (Hyperbolic) geometry both configurations shown at fig.7 a, b exist 
although lines at fig.7b are not parallels in Lobachevsky's sense. But in addition one 
gets a new specific sort of sheaf, namely that of Lobachevsky's parallels. 
Correspondingly one gets a new normal line and a new normal surface, which 
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Lobachevsky calls limiting circle (or otherwise horocircle) and limiting sphere 
(otherwise horosphere) (fig.9):
fig.9 
To see that horocircles on given horosphere verify AP (and in fact the rest of axioms 
of Euclidean geometry) observe the following. Call (as usual) a given straight line l 
parallel to a given plane α just in case l is parallel (in Lobachevsky's sense) to its 
orthogonal projection m onto α. It can be then easily shown by usual synthetic methods 
(I leave it as an exercise) that given l and α as before there exist a unique plane β 
having no common point with α (that is, parallel to α in the usual sense) such that l 
lays in β. This lemma, which resembles AP in a way, doesn't depend on AP. Notice that 
any horocircle laying on a given horosphere can be obtained as an intersection of the 
horosphere with a plane parallel to the sheaf of Lobachevsky's parallels corresponding 
to this horosphere. This immediately implies that the non-standard interpretation of 
Euclidean geometry suggested by Lobachevsky verifies AP (the horocircles are called 
here parallel in the usual Euclidean sense of having no shared point) (fig. 10):         
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Lobachevsky himself uses a slightly different lemma (STP, proposition 28) for the 
same purpose . Let me quote only his conclusion (STP, proposition 34), which shows 
more precisely the way in which Lobachevsky anticipated Hilbertean scheme:
"On the limiting surface [i.e. on the horosphere] sides and angles of triangles hold the 
same relations as in the Usual [i.e. Euclidean] geometry". 
This crucial observation allowed Lobachevsky to develop (what we call today) 
Hyperbolic trigonometry on the basis of the usual (Euclidean) trigonometry. He writes 
down basics of this new calculus in the form of four (eqational) identites (STP, 
proposition 37, formula 8). In FG and NFG  Lobachevsky applies this calculus to a large 
class of geometrical problems and in AIG -  to calculation of certain integrals, which 
earlier were not given any geometrical sense. On the top of that Lobachevsky puts 
forward in FG the following general argument purporting to show that the new calculus 
guarantees consistency of his Imaginary geometry:
"[1] As far as we are found the equations which represent relations between sides and 
angles of triangle ... Geometry turns into Analytics, where calculations are necessarily 
coherent and one cannot discover anything what is not already present in the basic 
equations. [2] It is then impossible to arrive at contradiction, which would oblige us to 
refute first principles, unless this contradiction is hidden in those basic equations 
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themselves. [3] But one observes that the replacement of sides a, b, c by ai, bi, ci 
turn these [basic hyperbolic] equations into equations of Spherical Trigonometry. [4] 
Since relations between lines in the Usual [i.e. Euclidean] and Spherical geometry are 
always the same, [5] the new [i.e. Imaginary] geometry and [Hyperbolic] Trigonometry 
will be always in accordance with each other." (FG , i stands here for the square root 
from minus one) 
Let's analyse this complicated argument step by step. First ([1]) Lobachevsky claims 
that trigonometric relations valid for an arbitrary triangle allow one to translate the 
whole of geometry from synthetic to analytic language. He takes this claim for 
granted in case of Euclidean geometry and then says that it equally holds in a more 
general case of Imaginary geometry. In [2] Lobachevsky apparently assumes that 
algebraic transformations are better controllable than synthetic constructive 
procedures. The transparency of the " analytic" procedures guarantees that  if basic 
equations contain no hidden contradiction) so does the rest. One cannot claim the 
same for constructive synthetic procedures since such procedures can bring a 
contradiction at any step of reasoning but not only at the initial step of laying out 
basic principles. So the analytic means help to reduce the question about consistency 
of Imaginary geometry to that concerning only foundations ("basic equations") of this 
geometry. [3] is a crucial observation (first made by Lambert), which allows for a 
profound analogy between Spherical and Hyperbolic geometries. Lobachevsky didn't 
understand the precise sense of this analogy but rather took it as purely formal (see 
again Note 20). His  argument, as far as I understand it, is the following. Spherical 
geometry (including spherical trigonometry) is a well-established part of Euclidean 
geometry ([4]) and so there is no reason to expect any contradiction in it.  The two 
parts of Spherical geometry - synthetic and analytic - match each other just like in 
case of Plane Euclidean geometry. Hence Spherical trigonometry is consistent. Since 
the formal substitution a-->ai turns every equation of Spherical trigonometry into an 
equation of Hyperbolic trigonometry Hyperbolic trigonometry is consistent if Spherical 
trigonometry is consistent. Hence Hyperbolic trigonometry is consistent. But ([5]) the 
match between the analytic part of Imaginary geometry (that is, Hyperbolic 
trigonometry) and the synthetic part of Imaginary geometry can be assured just like in 
Spherical case. Hence Imaginary geometry (including its synthetic part) is consistent 
in general. The line of the argument can be pictured with the following diagram 
(fig.11):
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The match between synthetic and analytic parts guarantees that if one of them is 
consistent then so is the other. This works both in Hyperbolic and Spherical cases. The 
formal substitution a-->ai allowing for the switch between the two cases on their 
analytic sides supposedly preserves consistency. The consistency of Spherical 
geometry is guaranteed by the fact that this geometry makes part of Euclidean 
geometry (actually of Euclidean stereometry). Thus the consistency of Hyperbolic 
geometry is ultimately implied by that of Euclidean geometry.  
It is tempting to see in this Lobachevsky's argument a proof of relative consistency in 
Hilbert's sense. Even if such reading is not unreasonable one should keep in mind that, 
first, this argument is in fact very vaguely formulated and, second, it is produced by 
Lobachevsky at the absence of any genuine understanding of what is behind the formal 
correspondence between trigonometric identities in Spherical and Hyperbolic cases. 
The main source of Lobachevsky's ambiguity here is the lack of any proper distinction 
between Imaginary (Hyperbolic), Spherical and Usual (Euclidean) geometries. The 
context strongly suggests considering them on equal footing as we do it today. But 
remind that Lobachevsky also considers the Usual geometry as a special case of 
Imaginary and Spherical geometry as a part of Usual. At least the latter assumption is 
essential for the argument.  When Lobachevsky says that "relations between lines in 
the Usual and Spherical geometry are always the same" he, in my understanding, looks 
at a given sphere as an Euclidean object but not intrinsically. Thus he doesn't think 
about it as a model in anything like today's sense. The formal character of 
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substitution a-->ai  is obviously explained by Lobachevsky's lack of understanding of 
what is behind it. Lobachevsky like Lambert simply noticed the striking analogy 
between trigonometric identities valid in his Imaginary geometry and well-known 
trigonometric identities for spherical triangles. The analogy suggested considering 
Plane Imaginary geometry as a sort of Spherical geometry on a sphere of imaginary 
radius, for example, of radius equal to i. Prima facie this didn't make any geometrical 
sense. But the analogy also suggested that the new trigonometric calculus could work 
just as well as Spherical trigonometry, and this in its turn suggested that the 
synthetic reasoning behind this new calculus was also correct. This is the core of the 
above argument. But obviously the analogy noticed first by Lambert and later by 
Lobachevsky was calling for explanation. It is nothing but an irony of history that 
Lobachevsky's eventual "formalism", which was due to the lack of understanding of 
one particular mathematical question, could be later seen as an anticipation of 
Hilbert's deliberate formalism based on serious epistmological considerations. 
5) Rethinking Hilbertian Scheme with Lobachevsky
We have seen that although Lobachevsky had some elements of Hilbertian scheme at 
his disposal he was quite strongly attached to the traditional way of geometrical 
thinking. Given the historical distance between Lobachevsky and Hilbert this is hardly 
very surprising. What is more surprising is the unusual way in which Lobachevsky uses 
these elements of Hilbertian scheme. Remind that Hilbertian scheme comes with the 
idea according to which models serve (among other purposes) for providing an intuitive 
support to abstract (formal) theories. But Lobachevsky's non-standard model of the 
Euclidean plane does not serve this purpose. This author has an intuitive support both 
for Euclidean and his Imaginary geometry to begin with and use his non-standard model 
for building a system of calculus. Remind also that in order to build a theory in a 
Hilbertain setting one needs first to take a suitable metatheory for granted. But 
Lobachevsky proceeds in the opposite epistemological order. He naturally grants first 
Euclidean geometry (in the sense that he assumes its consistency), not his Imaginary  
geometry. But then he uses the latter as a metatheory for the former but not the 
other way round! He builds a new model of well-known Euclidean Planimetry by means of 
a new non-accomplished theory and this helps him to accomplish the theory in 
question. This technically clever trick from Hilbertian viewpoint looks weird.  
Although we have found in Lobachevsky something strongly resembling the notion of 
model relevant to Hilbertian scheme the epistemological background behind this 
scheme doesn't square well with Lobachevsky's work. We didn't find in Lobachevsky 
any trace of the ifthenist attitude described by Greenberg in the above quote or any 
particular tendency toward an abstract or formal thinking (as opposed to concrete 
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intuitive thinking). One obvious moral about this is the need to read historical textes 
carefully and avoid their unjustified anachronistic interpretations. But another moral is 
the need of keeping mind open to eventual revisions of currently accepted views about 
mathematics. I shall now show how one can make a better sense of Lobachevsky's 
work than just saying that this author anticipated certain elements of Hilbertian 
scheme but didn't know how to put them rightly together. Elsewhere (Rodin, 
forthcoming) I presented a general theoretical argument aming to show that Hilbertian 
scheme is unsatisfactory. Here I summarize and illustrate the argument using 
Lobachevsky's work as an appropriate historical example. I shall start with a more 
precise analysis of tensions between Hilbertian scheme and Lobachevsky's work.  
Hilbertian scheme introduces a twofold relativity in mathematical (and more generally - 
in theoretical) thinking. Using Fregean terminology I shall call the first kind of relativity 
relativity of sense and the second kind - relativity of reference  or semantical 
relativity (Note 21). The relativity of sense amounts to saying that meaning of basic 
theoretical terms like "plane",  "curve", "between", etc. are context-dependent, i.e. 
that the terms mean different things in different theories (for example, in Euclidean 
and in Lobachevskian geometries). This equally applies to derived terms like "triangle", 
which are defined through basic ones. Semantical relativity in its turn has to do with 
the assumption according to which mathematical terms just like words in natural 
languages not only mean something (i.e. have a sense) but also refer to something. 
Within Hilbertian scheme reference of mathematical terms is obtained through 
interpretation of a given formal theory, i.e. through picking up one (or more) of its 
models. These features of Hilbertian scheme support an anti-essentialist view about 
mathematical objects according to which basic geometrical notions like that of point or 
straight line have no mathematical content outside a given theory (and this content 
always changes when one changes a theory). 
The semantical account just given involves an obvious infinite regress since to get a 
model M for a given theory T one needs to repeat the whole reasoning once again, 
namely, build another theory T' and specify its model M'  which can allow for building 
the desired model M of T. The usual way to stop this regress is this: one assignes to 
pair (T', M '') a special epistemic status of metatheory, which implies that in the given 
context M' and T' are taken for granted. 
Since Lobachevsky recognised horocircles on a horosphere in a hyperbolic space as 
Euclidean straight lines one may argue that Lobachevsky already well understood 
Hilbertian semantical relativity. However this argument is not conclusive as we shall 
now see. To show this I shall not try to reveal Lobachevsky's hidden assumptions but 
rather suggest an alternative understanding of his explicite geometrical construction, 
which will allow us to avoid the absurd conclusion that Lobachevsky used his Imaginary 
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geometry as a metatheory for developing Euclidean geometry in a unusual way.  
A Hilbertian analysis of the Lobachevsky's finding goes like this. Since Euclidean plane 
and straight lines on this plane can be equally represented by the usual intuitive 
concepts (supported by traditional drawings) and by a horosphere with horocircles on 
it the two representation share in common a conceptual core of these notions and in 
addition have certain specific features, which are theoretically superfluous. This 
conceptual core can be identified by Hilbertian scheme (using formal relations between 
relata of "any nature" as a shared form (rather than essence) of the two things, then 
abstracted away and given the name of Euclidean structure. I claim that this analysis 
is inconclusive (Note 22) because the two "representations" cannot and shouldn't be 
taken on equal footing.  For on the traditional "standard" side we have here a pure 
geometrical intuition (whatever this might mean) while on the other side we have a 
well-elaborated theoretical construct, namely a horosphere, which doesn't make sense 
outside its ambient hyperbolic space and without its supporting theory of Hyperbolic 
geometry. I don't believe one can apply to such different things the same notion of 
abstraction and then talk about about a shared structure allegedly specified by this 
abstraction. In fact Hilbertian scheme suggests in this case two different procedures. 
In the case of traditional (standard) representation it suggests simply to give up the 
usual adherence to intuition and re-orient geometrical thinking toward a more formal 
mode. But in the case of a non-standard representation it suggests something 
different: to leave a theory supporting this representation out of consideration by 
providing it with a special epistemic status of metatheory. Even if this move is 
supposed to be only temporal it is generally not justified. As we have seen in 
Lobachevsky's case it leads to a sheer epistemic absurdity. 
The above argument becomes particularly clear if one looks at the situation from a 
Riemanian viewpoint. Euclidan plan E2 and Hyperbolic 3-space H3 are (or at least can be 
readily conceived of as) Riemanian manifolds. But a horosphere is not! A horosphere is 
not a manifold of its own but an embedding  E2-->H3 of one manifold into the other. 
For intrinsically a horosphere is indistinguishable from E2. This is why the intrinsic 
viewpoint is inappropriate when on talks about a horosphere meaning a specific 
surface living in Hyperbolic space. In a Riemanian perspective a horosphere cannot be 
seen as an embodiment of the concept of Euclidean plane standing on equal footing 
with the "usual" embodiment of this concept because the notion of horosphere doesn't 
make sense outside a Hyperbolic space and a Hyperbolic space is a manifold of its own, 
which cannot be left out of consideration in the given context. This shows that the 
Hilbertian way of thinking about this situation, which amounts to "carving out" a given 
horosphere from its ambient space and forgetting about its supporting theory (by 
calling it "metatheory"), is seriously misleading. 
25
I shall use the above Riemanian view on the problem for introducing some general 
notions important for what follows. Embedding E2-->H3 is a map between the two 
manifolds. It is an irreversible map, i.e. it is not an isomorphism. In structuralist terms 
this observation is tantamount to saying that E2 and H3 support different structures. 
However this map can be also viewed as a partial isomorphism between the whole of E2 
and a part of H3, namely a horosphere. As I have just argued this latter view is 
misleading even if not plainly wrong because the separation of parts of H3 (or of any 
other space) changes properties of these parts dramatically as it happens when one 
looks at a horosphere intrinsically and it "turns into" an Euclidean plane. However this 
misleading view is essential for making sense of the notion of Euclidean structure in 
the given example. For given an isomorphism A<-->B (e.g. isomorphism between E2 and 
a horosphere) one can think about objects A,B "up to isomorphism" and replace both by 
a new abstract or "formal" object C (e.g. Euclidean structure).  With a general map (in 
particular, with an embedding) A-->B  one cannot do anything similar. To show this I 
shall use Frege's account of abstraction given in his (1884). Consider a class of 
individuals with an equivalence relation on it. Frege's abstraction amounts, roughly, to 
replacement of each equivalence subclass by a particular abstract object (Note 23). 
The existence of isomorphism is an equivalence relation, so reasoning "up to 
isomorphism" (at least in simple cases like our) can be understood in terms of Frege's 
abstraction. But the existence of a general map A-->B is not an equivalence (since it is 
not symmetric) and so Frege's abstraction doesn't apply . A general map A-->B 
doesn't make objects A,B in any reasonable sense the same and doesn't allow for 
replacement of both by some new object C. (Note 24)
Hilbertian scheme and Mathematical Structuralism are usually opposed to various kinds 
of essentialism about mathematical objects. But the alternative approach I am thinking 
of is different. While Structuralism comes with the slogan "think up to isomorphism" 
(Note 25) this alternative approach amounts to thinking "up to general morphism" 
(where morphism is another word for map). This analogy shouldn't be taken too 
literally because the mere existence of general morphism between two objects doesn't 
provide any sense in which these objects could be thought of as the same. Thinking 
about mathematical objects "up to general morphism" amounts to conceiving of them 
through their mutual maps. The idea is not a new one. In his (1925) von Neuman first 
made an attempt of building an axiomatic set theory taking the notion of function (i.e. 
map between sets) as primitive. Later this idea has been realised in a different setting 
by Lawvere in (1964) who used for it Category theory, which is a general theory of 
maps (called in this theory morphisms). A similar approach (also based on Category 
theory) to Riemanian geometry brought about Synthetic Differential geometry. Instead 
of making assumptions about how a general manifold looks like one begins here with 
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describing a category of manifolds, which comprises the class of "all" manifolds with 
all available maps (but not only isomorphisms) between them. For this end one first 
assumes that manifolds form a category (i.e. a class of objects with composable maps 
between them) and then makes appropriate additional assumption, which specify the 
given category as the category of Riemanian manifolds (Note 26). For further details 
and references see (Bell 2005, chapter 10) and for further philosophical discussion 
see my (2007). Here I shall only show how this categorical approach allows for making 
a better sense of Lobachevsky's work. 
As we have seen Lobachevsky certainly understood how Euclidean Planimetry can be 
translated into terms of his Imaginary , i.e. Hyperbolic, geometry. This allowed him to 
provide Hyperbolic geometry with a powerful analytic apparatus. But he didn't need 
anything like Hilbert's notion of formal theory for this purpose. Categorical approach 
to theory-building sketched above takes this notion of translation (under the name of 
morphism) as primitive and purports to (re)construct further mathematical concepts 
out of it. So it makes it less surprising that a particular map found by Lobachevsky 
turns to be a key for the whole of his theory. 
In 19th century people learnt to think about complex numbers as points on Euclidean 
plane, exchange points for straight lines and vice versa in Projective geometry 
(projective duality) and make other earlier unknown translations between different 
parts of mathematics. Hilbert's notion of formal theory and the later notion of formal 
structure provided a general epistemological account of these findings. But it was in 
fact only a limited and insufficient account, which didn't fully grasp their potential. For 
the Hilbertian account has been based on a strong assumption according to which all 
"good" translations are isomorphisms. When Jordan in 1870 first distinguished 
between isomorphisms and homomorphisms in Group theory he conceived of the latter 
as partial isomorphisms (Note 27). However historical examples like Lobachevsky's 
suggest to abandon this way of thinking about morphisms and treat different kinds of 
morphisms on equal footing to begin with. Instead of looking at Lobachevsky as one of 
Hilbert's predecessors and asking how much of the content of (Hilbert 1899) was 
already present in Lobachevsky's works one should rather recognise that 
Lobachevsky's project was essentially different and in certain respects more 
promising.   
6) Conclusion
We have seen that Lobachevsky's writings provide no support for the canonical story 
about early days of Non-Euclidean geometry, which has been produced in order to 
comply Hilbertian views on mathematics with the earlier history of this discipline. In 
particular we have found in Lobachevsky no tendency towards a retreat from spatial 
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intuition and spatial experience and no trace of ifthenism. We have also seen that the 
often repeated claim according to which Non-Euclidean geometry cannot be intuitively 
conceived in principle is nothing but a philosophical myth designed for supporting a 
particular view on mathematics. Non-Euclidean geometry extends Euclidean intuition 
but doesn't throw it away. At least this is a possible way to understand it. However 
important Hilbert's formalist views about mathematics might be (both historically and 
theoretically) they should not be taken for granted when one makes a historical 
research. 
A more specific conclusion concerns the notion of map and its historical genesis. In 
today's mathematics this notion has many faces and subsumes in particular, older 
notions of function and geometrical transformation. The face relevant to the present 
discussion concerns the notion of map as "translation" from one geometrical 
framework into another. The idea that familiar geometrical concepts like that of 
straight line can be rendered in unusual ways (so a straight line in a different 
framework can "become" a curve) is usually associated with Hilbert's fundamental text 
(1899), his notions of axiomatic theory and its interpretation, and later developments 
including Model theory. However, as we have seen, Lobachevsky had the idea of map 
but conceived of it in a way very different from Hilbert's.
To claim that Lobachevsky anticipated Category theory would be even more absurd 
than claim that he anticipated Hilbert's Formal axiomatic method. However there is 
nothing absurd in analysing Lobachevsky's finding  in terms of maps rather than in 
terms of models understood in Hilbertian sense. A careful reading of historical 
mathematical texts as ever provides a lot of material for reflection on today's hot 
topics. Lobachevsky's recovering of Euclidean plane in Hyperbolic space through a 
horosphere allows us for a better understanding of where today's notion of map 
comes from. Such historical understanding seems me necessary for further 
development of this new mathematical concept.  
Thus the straightforward answer to the question whether or not Lobachevsky had a 
model of his geometry is that the question is ill-posed. I opted nevertheless for taking 
it seriously for two reasons. First, because this question naturally arises within the 
standard view on history of geometry of 19th century. So the question provided me a 
good opportunity to suggest a revision of this standard view. Second, because this 
straightforward answer doesn't imply that Lobachevsky's work has nothing to do with 
today's notion of model. As we have seen Lobachevsky certainly grasped a basic idea 
behind this notion, namely the possibility to represent objects and relations belonging 
to a given mathematical theory by objects and relations of another theory. But as I 
have argued in this paper one can make a better sense of Lobachevsky's work than 
claim that he was one of Hilbert's predecessors. It is far more interesting, in my view, 
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to find in Lobachevsky and other older writers grains of some conceptual possibilities, 
which hasn't been yet fully explored, and then try to develop them further. Instead of 
looking at Lobachevsky's way of translating between different theories as an early 
incomplete grasp of a later notion of model I suggested a different approach, which 
takes this notion of "incomplete" translation seriously and puts it into foundations of 
geometry. Then as it so often happens in history apparent shortcomings of an older 
work become to look as strokes of genius. 
Endnotes:
Note 0:
The shortened titles of Lobachevsky's works used in this paper are explained in the 
Bibliography, section A, where the reader can find the full references. 
Note 1: 
Consider, for example, this account provided by Wikipedia (entry "Non-Euclidean 
Geometry" as for February 20, 2008      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-
Euclidean_geometry):
"Even after the work of Lobachevsky, Gauss, and Bolyai, the question remained: does 
such a model exist for hyperbolic geometry? The model for hyperbolic geometry was 
answered by Eugenio Beltrami, in 1868, who first showed that a surface called the 
pseudosphere has the appropriate curvature to model a portion of hyperbolic space, 
and in a second paper in the same year, defined the Klein model, the Poincaré disk 
model, and the Poincaré half-plane model which model the entirety of hyperbolic 
space...."
A very different and, in my view, much more satisfactory treatment of this question 
has been given in 2007 by Roberto Torretti in another public internet resource: 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: plato.stanford.edu/entries/geometry-19th/ 
Note 2:
(Greenberg 1974) is a geometry textbook of college level containing some historical 
and philosophical material. It may be argued that it is not appropriate to take historical 
and philosophical claims contained in this book too seriously and criticise them 
thoroughly. I disagree. Such books written for younger students often make explicit 
certain assumptions about history and philosophy of mathematics, which in more 
serious studies are often taken for granted or hidden behind further details. The fact 
that on Greenberg's account these assumptions are oversimplified and perhaps even 
partly confused is a price to be paid for its compactness. Since my aim here is to 
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reconsider basics rather than elaborate on details (Greenberg 1974) serves me as a 
perfect reference.   
Note 3.
Beware that we are talking about the pure mathematics here, not about a study of 
physical space. The scheme of theory-building in question usually comes with a strong 
epistemological thesis according to which these two things are quite distinct and the 
former has a priority over the latter in the following sense : one may reasonably ask 
whether a given mathematical construction correctly describes physical phenomena 
but one is not allowed to use physical arguments in pure mathematics.
Note 4
My presentation of Hilbertian scheme is slightly anachronistic with respect to Hilbert 
(1899) and based on a later distinction between syntax and semantics. I opt for this 
anachronism here because my aim here is to make explicit a fairly standard today's 
understanding of the matter rather than to analyse its genesis. 
Note 5:
This is, of course, a strong and highly controversial metaphysical claim, which can be 
challenged, in particular, via a reference to changing entities: a changing entity A has 
some property P before a change and doesn't have this property after the change. 
This problem is usually (but in my view mistakenly) seen as irrelevant to mathematics 
since, as people often believe, mathematical objects cannot change.      
Note 6:
I provide some further details about Hilbertian scheme in section 5 of the main text.
Note 7: 
I don't claim here that Greenberg's "formalist viewpoint" is indeed shared by the 
majority of living working mathematicians. Actually I think that this is not the case. 
Nevertheless Hilbertian scheme (liberally understood) remains a fairly standard 
"official" framework for doing mathematics, and in this sense its identification with 
"modern mathematics" is justified.  
Note 8:
This choice of references needs a justification. I provide it here beginning with a brief 
description of Lobachevsky's works in Geometry. G is a geometry textbook published 
only after the author's death, which contains no material related to Non-Euclidean 
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geometry. FG and NFG are two author's attempts to write a fundamental geometrical 
treatise covering the whole of the discipline from its foundations to its special 
chapters. Lobachevsky's project of rebuilding foundations of geometry developed in 
these two works doesn't reduce to what became known as Lobachevskean geometry 
but also includes some other new ideas which I cannot discuss here. IG and AIG have, on 
the contrary, a more limited task of presentation of a new analytic apparatus related 
to Lobachevskian geometry (the hyperbolic trigonometry) and demonstration of its 
power. Lobachevsky introduces here this apparatus "by hand" reducing its geometrical 
background to minimum.  STP is another shortened account of the basics of 
Lobachevskean geometry, which, however, is theoretically complete: it begins with 
synthetics geometrical considerations and proceeds to analytic methods. STP doesn't 
cover some more specific issues (like calculation of areas and volumes) treated in FG 
and NFG but unlike IG includes the foundational synthetic part. PG is the last overview 
of Lobachevskean geometry written by the author; it is less systematic than STP and 
fixes some minor technical problems, which Lobachevsky found in STP after its 
publication. This description makes it clear that  STP is the best compact systematic 
presentation of the topic written by Lobachevsky himself.  Importantly Lobachevsky's 
notion of "Imaginary geometry" remains quite  stable across all of these works. This 
allows me not to refer to any particular period of his work in the present  general 
discussion. English translation of STP is available and referred to in the Bibliography 
below. 
Note 9:
AP is also known under the name of Playfair's Axiom.
Note 10:
For suppose that m and l intersect in A. Then the external angle RPA is equal to the 
internal angle PSA. This contradicts the theorem about an external angle which implies 
that RPA  must be strictly superior to PSA .    
Note 11:
To prove (iii) rigorously one needs Pasch's axiom which Lobachevsky never mentions 
but always tacitly takes for granted. This axiom first introduced in (Pasch 1882) says 
this:
Given a triangle and a straight line intersecting one of the triangle's sides but passing 
through none of the triangle's apexes the given line intersects one of the two other 
sides of the given triangle. 
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To apply this axiom to the given case one needs a simple additional construction, which 
I leave to the reader.  Remind that my point here concerns common intuition but not 
rigorous proofs: whatever improvement on (iii) can be possibly made it remains 
intuitively evident.  
Note 12: 
Consider, for example, the first half of Lobachevsky's proof of the fact that his 
definition of parallel doesn't depend of the initial choice of point P of this parallel. Let 
m  = PA be the right parallel to the given straight line l passing through the given point 
P outside l , PS be the perpendicular dropped from P to l, P'  be any other point of m 
laying to the right from P, and finally P'S' be the perpendicular dropped from P' to l 
(fig. 5). We now show that given any point B inside angle AP'S'  line P'B intersects l at 
certain point D. (This will mean that m  is right parallel to l with respect to P'). To see 
this draw line PB. Since B lays inside angle APS  and m is right parallel to l with respect 
to P line PB intersects l at certain point C. Then draw line P'B , denote by E the point 
of intersection of P'S' and PC, and consider triangle ES'C. P'C intersects side EC of 
this triangle in B and doesn't intersect ES' by the choice of B. Hence P'B intersects the 
third side S'C (and hence line l) in some point D. 
fig. 5
The last step requires Pasch's axiom, see Note 10 above. The other half of the proof 
corresponding to the case when P' lays to the left of P  I leave as an exercise to the 
reader. 
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Note 13:
see (Bonola 1955)
Note 14:
In recent philosophical discussions this claim is often identified as Kant's view. For the 
obvious historical reason Kant never distinguished between Euclidean and Non-Euclidean 
geometries in his writings but always refers to geometry tout court. The only reason 
to identify geometry mentioned by Kant as Euclidean in today's technical sense of the 
term is Kant's choice of examples: in particular, in his Critique of Pure Reason 
(A713/B741) Kant refers to Euclid's proof of the fact that the sum of internal angles 
of a given triangle is equal to two right angles. If Kant would learn more about the 
Problem of Parallels (from Lambert or otherwise) he would likely change his examples 
without changing principle arguments.  
Note 15:
Hereafter translations of Lobachevsky's passages from Russian are mine. 
Note 16:
Lobachevsky doesn't distinguish clearly between geometrical truth and truth about 
physical space, even if some of his passages suggest such a distinction. Given his 
empiricists view on geometry this is hardly surprising. 
Note 17:
I have here in mind Euclid's distinction between Axioms and Postulates, which I explain 
in the end of section 4 of this paper. The question whether a construction with some 
desired properties is doable or not often have no trivial answer. 
Note 18:
See Bonola (1955). Wallis (1616-1703) first realised that P5 is equivalent to any 
proposition, which grants the existence of similar triangles. Lambert re-interpreted 
this result in terms of the possibility of scaling , i.e. the free choice of the unit of 
length. In my view there is a sense in which these authors resolved the Problem of 
Parallels.  For the scaling property of geometrical spaces can be justified on 
epistemological and pragmatic grounds and then be adopted as a plausible axiom or 
postulate. This certainly makes sense  if geometry is seen as a theory supporting 
measuring practices rather than an a priori science of space. It is moreover 
remarkable that having at hands what looked like a genuine proof of P5 (based on a 
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new plausible principle) Lambert didn't rule out the possibility of Non-Euclidean 
geometries.  
Note 19:
See (Bonola 1955). Sacceri constructs a quadrilateral with three right angles and then 
conciders separetely cases when the fourth angle is right, acute and obtuse. Hence 
the three hypotheses. The third hypothesis can be ruled out without the use of P5 but 
the second cannot. 
Note 20: 
In the same year of 1840 when Lobachevsky published his STP Ferdinand Minding 
(1806-1885) published in the Crelle Journal a note (Minding 1840), where he showed 
that trigonometrical formulae for triangles formed by geodesics on surfaces of 
constant negative curvature can be obtained from trigonometrical formulae for 
spherical triangles by replacement of usual trigonometric functions by hyperbolic 
functions. Lobachevsky in STP makes a similar observation about straight lines of his 
geometry (see section 3 below in the main text). A communication between the two 
authors would most probably lead to the discovery made by Beltrami later in 1868! 
However Lobachevsky apparently didn't read this Minding's paper in spite of the fact 
that the library of Kazan University had this issue  the Crelle Journal. At least the 
preserved list of books and journals borrowed by Lobachevsky from the University 
Library doesn't include this reference (see ŁŁººŁ et al. 1974).     
Note 21: 
See (Frege 1892). Notice that the two kind of relativity I discuss below build upon the 
more general denotational  relativity which allows for replacement of any sign having 
certain sense and certain reference by another sign. 
Note 22:
I don't mean, of course, that there is a simple error in this reasoning. After all it 
grounded a strategy of mathematical research - I mean the structuralist program 
broadly conceived - which proved successful in 20th century and brought about a 
great part of the bulk of today's mathematical knowledge. It is my view, which I cannot 
fully expose and defend in this paper, that today the structuralist strategy is mostly 
expired. See my 2007 for further discussion. My critical arguments against 
mathematical structuralism don't challenge its historical importance.  
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Note 23:
Frege's example: the equivalence relation of being parallel between Euclidean straight 
lines and the notion of direction abstracted away by the described method. Frege's 
notion of abstraction allows for more refined interpretations than one just given in the 
main text but this have no impact on the following argument. 
Note 24:
Let me be more precise. The bare existence of morphism between two given objects 
A ,B  (i.e. existence of morphism of the form A-->B  or of the form B-->A) is an 
equivalence relation (let's call this relation R1). However the existence of morphism 
from A to B (i.e. existence of morphism of the form A-->B  ) for a given ordered pair 
A ,B  is not (let's call this latter relation R2). Beware that R1 is not the relation of 
isomorphism (since morphisms in question are, generally, not isomorphisms). Call now 
objects A, B  morphic just in case they hold R1 and then observe that all sets, groups 
and topological spaces are correspondingly morphic (obviously objects are morphic only 
if they belong to the same category). This shows that the idea of "thinking up to 
general morphism" by identifying morphic objects like structuralists do this with 
isomorphic objects is sheerly absurd:  R1 is too weak to replace the relation of 
isomorphism in any reasonable way. R2, which takes the sense of morphisms into 
account, is stronger but it is no longer an equivalence relation, and so it gives no new 
meaning to the expression "morphic objects" (which suggests a splitting of a given 
class of objects  into equivalence sub-classes of morphic objects). This shows that one 
cannot use R2 either in anything like the same way people use the relation of 
isomorphism in a Hilbertian setting. 
Note 25:
Preparing his (1899) Hilbert thought about classes of isomorphic constructions (later 
called models) and their shared forms (structures).  He thought that in this way one 
may distinguish between what is theoretically significant (the form) from what is not 
(specific features of particular models). Hence his idea of formal mathematics. The 
fact that formal theories, generally, have also so-called non-standard models, which 
are not  isomorphic to standard models (i.e. the models one begins the Fregean 
abstraction with) Hilbert first realised and first treated only in his (1900); in the 
second and later editions of his (1899) Hilbert added a new controversial axiom 
(Vollstandigkeitsaxiom) supposed to treat the same problem. The property of an 
axiom system, which consists of the fact that all of its models are isomorphic was 
called by Veblen in his (1904) categoricity. Since then the pursuit of categoricity 
became a part of programs of formalisation of mathematics through Hilbertian 
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scheme.  It has been realised that the requirement of categoricity cannot be generally 
met without a price, which in many important cases, like in axiomatic Set theories, 
turns to be quite high. 
Note 26:
A category of manifolds can be also obtained through construing manifolds and their 
maps by some other methods and then putting all these things together. The approach 
I'm talking about is clearly different. 
Note 27:
In Book 2, section 67 of his (1870) Jordan distinguishes between isomorphisme 
holoédrique (literally "complete isomorphism), which is isomorphism in today's sense, 
and isomorphisme mériédrique (literally "partial isomorphism") called today 
homomorphism (see Jordan 1957 and Kline 1972 ).  
 
Bibliography: 
A) Principle source:
This Russian complete edition of Lobachevsky's works contains the following works in 
Geometry (listed below in the chronological order by dates of their creation or first 
publication):
1823: Geometry (G)
1829-30: Foundations of Geometry (FG)
1835-37: Imaginary Geometry (IG) (1935 - Russian version and 1937 - the author's 
French version; the two version are slightly different in their content). 
1835-38: New Foundations of Geometry (NFG)
36
1836: Application of Imaginary Geometry to some Integrals (AIG)
1840: Studies in Theory of Parallels (STP) 
1855-56: Pangeometry (PG)
First publication of French version of IG: 
Lobachevsky, N. I., 1837. "Géométrie imaginaire," : 295-320. Journal für die reine und 
angewandte Mathematik 17
First publication of German version of STP:
Lobachevsky, N. I., 1840. . Berlin: F. Fincke.  Geometrische Untersuchungen zur 
Theorie der Parallellinien
English translation of STP by G. B. Halsted is printed as a supplement to (Bonola 
1955.)
B) other literature:
Beltrami, E., 1868, "Saggio di interpetrazione della geometria non-euclidea", Giornale di 
Matematiche, v.6, p. 284-312
Beltrami, E., 1868-69, "Teoria fondamentale degli spazii di curvatura constante", 
Annali di matematica pura et applicata (2), 2, p. 232-255
Bonola, R.,1955, Non-Euclidean Geometry, Dover Publications, Inc., New York
Frege, G., 1884 (or later editions), Grundlagen der Arithmetik, Wilhelm Koebner, 
Breslau
Frege, G., 1892, "Über Sinn und Bedeutung", Zeitschrift für Philosophie und 
philosophische Kritik, NF 100 , p. 25–50.
Gauss, C.F., 1981, Werke (herausgegeben von der Königlichen Gesellschaft der 
Wissenschaften zu Göttingen), Olms  v.8,
Greenberg, M.J., 1974, Euclidean and Non-Euclidean Geometries, W.H. Freeman and 
Company, San-Francisco
37
Hilbert, D. (1899 or later editions), Grundlagen der Geometrie, Teubner, Leipzig
Jordan, C., 1870, Traité des Substitutions et des équations algébriques, Gauthier-
Villars 
Kline, M., 1972, Mathematical Thought From Ancient to Modern Times, Oxford 
University Press
Lawvere, W., 1964, "Elementary Theory of the Category of Sets", Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Science, vol. 52, N6, p.1506-1511
Minding E.-F.-A.,1840, "Bemerkung ueber die Abwicklung krummer Linien von Flaechen", 
Journal de Crelle, Berlin, 6, p.159-161
Neumann J. von, 1925, "Ein Axiomatisierung der Mengenlehre", Journal fiir die reine und 
angewandte Mathematik, 154.
Pash, M., 1882, Vorlesungen ueber neuere Geometrie, Teubner-Verlag 
Rodin, A., 2007, On Categorical Theory-Building: Beyond the Formal , arXiv: 0707.3745 
